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Abstract: In “Three Perspectives on Argument,” Wenzel argued that scholars should orient their research around
the well-known triad of rhetorical, dialectical, and logical perspectives on argument. Despite the success of this triad
in orienting pluralistic research, Wentzel nonetheless maintained that an “eventual synthesis” of the three
perspectives was both possible and desirable. In this paper I reconsider Wenzel’s idea by asking what might be
preventing such a synthesis today. I argue that one obstacle is a common philosophical assumption about rhetoric
that opposes assertion to persuasion, truth to effectiveness. Following Barbara Cassin, I challenge this assumption
and consider how rhetoric might be thought in terms of performance. In the first part of the paper I discuss Wenzel’s
account of the triad and touch on a number of criticisms of the rhetorical approach that follow Wenzel’s
characterization of it. Second, I turn to Cassin to help bring out the historical context of this characterization which I
aim to challenge within argumentation theory. Finally, I argue for a way that we might reconcile epistemic- and
audience-based concerns within the new rhetoric framework of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.
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1. Introduction
In his landmark essay “Three Perspectives on Argument,” Joseph W. Wenzel argued that
scholars should orient their research around what is now the well-known triad of rhetorical,
dialectical, and logical perspectives on argument. The lasting influence of this essay is apparent
not only from the near universal adoption of this terminology among argumentation theorists, but
also in the overwhelming attention that has since been given to the dialectical approach—which
Wenzel had argued was the only perspective that could submit theses to “critical testing”.
Despite the success of Wenzel’s triad in orienting pluralistic research, he nonetheless maintained
that an “eventual synthesis” of the perspectives was both possible and desirable.
In this paper I want to reconsider Wenzel’s idea by asking what might be preventing such a
synthesis today. What I will argue is that one obstacle is a common philosophical assumption
about rhetoric as it is commonly understood within argumentation theory. This assumption is that
rhetoric is concerned with adapting arguments to be effective rather than their validity or truth
content. The problem with this assumption is that it creates un unbridgeable gap between
epistemic and rhetorical concerns, which I argue need not be the case. As many of the points I
develop in this paper require further elaboration, my aim is simply to raise enough doubt about
the conventional framing of this opposition to encourage further reflection.
In the first part of the paper I discuss Wenzel’s account of the distinction between logical
dialectical, and rhetorical approaches to argument, and then touch on a number of criticisms of
the rhetorical approach that follow Wenzel’s characterization of it. In the following section, I
turn to the work of Barbara Cassin to help bring out the historical context of this characterization
which long pre-dates Wenzel and which I aim to challenge within argumentation theory.
Building on this discussion, I then return to argumentation theory where I argue for a way that
1

we might reconcile epistemic- and audience-based concerns by following Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca.
2. Wenzel’s three perspectives and the reception of rhetoric
A good starting point for any discussion of rhetoric in argumentation theory is Wenzel’s
“Perspectives on Argument,” the locus classicus—as Ralph Johnson has called it—for “the view
that argumentation may be approached from different perspectives” (Johnson, 2009). As is well
known, Wenzel argues that the three perspectives on argumentation each focus on a different
aspect of the overall phenomenon of “argumentation”: where the logical perspective approaches
argument as a product, the dialectical approaches it as a procedure, and the rhetorical as a social
process (Wenzel, 1992, p. 124). While many today would contest the continued accuracy of
Wenzel’s characterization of these three approaches, few would deny that this text has been a
longstanding theoretical cornerstone of argumentation theory, and for this reason has had a
considerable influence on the way that scholars understand the scope of their own research.
Let us briefly revisit Wenzel’s original motivation for his “system” and see how it stands
up today. Wenzel gives four main reasons for the utility of his distinction.1 First, in view of the
proliferation of studies on argumentation, Wenzel thought that the three perspectives could serve
as a principle to organize scholarship (p. 136). In this respect, his approach has proved to be
tremendously helpful. Second, Wenzel thought that by opening up the perspectives from which
argumentation could be analyzed, over time a more complete picture of argumentation would
emerge. On this point as well Wenzel seems to have been correct. Third, Wenzel hoped that the
inclusion of the dialectical perspective would help put it on equal footing among the then
dominant rhetorical and logical perspectives (p. 140). As the remarkable success of dialectical
approaches will be of no surprise to anyone familiar with contemporary argumentation theory,
here too Wenzel seems to have been right on the mark.
For all this, it is on the fourth of Wenzel’s reasons that I want to focus. The fourth reason
that Wenzel gives is that by carefully distinguishing the three perspectives on argument it is
easier to prevent or eliminate “pseudo-problems” that arise in the literature (p. 136). While the
distinction may have performed this task for a time, I would submit that Wenzel’s version of the
distinction on this point has run its course.
The biggest drawback of the continued use of the product, procedure, and process
distinction to distinguish between competing approaches is that it perpetuates a number of
assumptions about the nature of argumentation. What I want to explore here is an assumption
that can be found in Wenzel but is in fact much older—and I would argue is in fact part of
argumentation theory’s inheritance from the history of philosophy. This assumption is the idea
that rhetoric is essentially concerned with “adapting discourse effectively to particular auditors”
(p. 125, emphasis mine).
Let us look at a few criticisms of rhetoric within argumentation theory that follow
Wenzel’s characterization. First, consider the epistemological theory of argument advocated by
Christoph Lumer, who criticizes rhetorical approaches for failing to establish any specific “truth
conditions” other than convincing an audience (Lumer, 2005, p. 237). For Lumer, this failure is
decisive precisely because his theory holds that “the standard function of argument” is “to lead
the argument’s addressee to a (rationally) justified belief” (p. 213). Since Lumer understands
1

I do not follow the order in which Wenzel gives these reasons.
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rhetoric to be concerned only with communicating effectively to audiences, he concludes that
rhetorical approaches must, at some point, neglect the “standard function” of argument by
elevating effectiveness above truth. In a similar way, John Biro and Harvey Siegel criticize
rhetorical approaches for neglecting epistemic goodness altogether. For Biro and Siegel, as far as
rhetoric is concerned a good argument can only be distinguished from a bad one on the basis of
whether or not “it advances the arguer’s position” (Biro & Siegel, 2006, p. 91-101). Thus
conceived, there are no external criteria by which rhetoric could coherently refuse to adopt
certain strategies if it advanced the arguer’s position. What these critics share—other than that
they all advocate an ‘objective epistemic theory’ of argument—is that they view rhetorical
concerns as having no bearing on the validity and truth of a particular argument. The reason for
this is that they both understand rhetoric to be concerned with the efficaciousness of arguments,
rather than their truth.
Similar criticisms of rhetoric can also be found in approaches more sympathetic to
rhetorical concerns. J. Anthony Blair, for example, concedes the importance of rhetorical
analyses for understanding relevant contextual information that would not be immediately
available from a spectator or analyst’s point of view (Blair, 2012, p. 98). However, he continues,
from the perspective of the real addressee of an argument, what must ultimately be assessed are
“the logical and dialectical merits of the case made.” From another angle, in the pragmadialectical approach—which purports to bridge the gap between the rhetorical and the
dialectical—rhetoric is explicitly understood to be concerned with the “potential effectiveness”
of arguments (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2006, p. 381-392). Where for pragma-dialectics an
argument’s reasonableness is decided by the satisfaction of dialectical criteria within a critical
discussion, for Blair it is logic that always has the final say.
Despite the many differences among the authors mentioned above, a common view of what
matters to rhetoric can be discerned. From the point of view of an engaged participant, rhetoric is
concerned with understanding one’s audience for the purpose of arguing effectively to that
audience. From the spectator’s point of view, rhetorical analysis is concerned with understanding
all the complexities of real argumentative situations in order to understand why a particular
argument was (or was not) effective in persuading an actual audience.
What emerges from this way of understanding rhetoric is a tension between two general
tendencies. On the one hand, there is a certain philosophical tendency that believes
argumentation is about truth; and, on the other hand, there is a tendency that seems more
interested in adapting arguments to audiences in such a way that those arguments will be
effective in light of the social context in which they are used. Between these two tendencies lies
a deep disagreement about a number of complex and longstanding philosophical choices that
probably will not, and likely should not, be solved within the field of argumentation studies
alone. Instead of wading into these debates on their own terms, I want to come at this problem
from a different angle. What I will argue is that this way of framing the problem assumes a
philosophical orientation toward language that pigeonholes rhetoric into adopting an orientation
toward language that is not its own. In doing so this conventional way of understanding
rhetorical approaches creates an unnecessary opposition between rhetorical and epistemic
concerns. In what follows I turn to the work of Barbara Cassin whose work can help
argumentation theorists diagnose some of the causes of this well-worn dichotomy.
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3. Epideixis, apodeixis, and the philosophical eclipse of rhetoric
A good part of Barbara Cassin’s work consists of challenging the standard philosophical
narrative about rhetoric that philosophy has inherited from Plato. As the Platonic story goes,
rhetoric is a skill or technique applied to language that attempts to win the favour of audiences
by speaking to them rather than about things as they really are. Philosophers, on the other hand,
are less concerned with how a particular audience will receive arguments, as what really matters
for the philosopher is the validity of arguments and the truth of their premises and conclusions.
To the extent that argumentation theory inherits its conceptual resources from the history of
philosophy, it should come as no surprise that the basic opposition at the heart of this story
should find its way into argumentation theory. To see where this tension comes from and how it
relates to argumentation theory, I will first provide a brief sketch of Cassin’s “sophistic” counterhistory of philosophy.
Cassin builds her case primarily on the work of Edward Schiappa, who argues that it was
Plato himself who coined the term “rhetoric” [rhêtorikê], rather than the Sophists (Schiappa,
1990). According to Schiappa, there is no known use of the term “rhetoric” before Plato’s
Gorgias, which is believed to have been written around 385BC. While the term “rhetor” was
widely used to refer to a person who gave public speeches, turning this practice into “rhetoric”, a
craft or technique of speaking, appears to be Plato’s invention. Instead, Cassin points out, the
sophists themselves refer only to their use of logos and not a specific technique called “rhetoric.”
What has happened then, Cassin continues, is that a particular philosophical way of
understanding logos, of understanding language, reason, and argument, has been made to conceal
others. As Cassin explains:
My claim is that rhetoric is a philosophical invention, an attempt to tame logos, in
particular, the Sophist’s logos and its effects. The creation of rhetoric by philosophy
is itself the very first “rhetorical turn”… [This] matters because the strength of logos
has been made to vanish, caught and subsumed under rhetoric. And rhetoric itself has
been made to vanish as soon as it is born. (Cassin, 2014, p. 76)
What Cassin is getting at here is that our understanding of rhetoric as a particular technique is
born out of a philosophical maneuver that circumscribes the legitimate use of logos. Through this
invention Plato establishes the now conventional opposition between philosophical speech, or
speech that asserts what is (i.e. ontology), and rhetorical speech, which is concerned less with the
way things are than it is with speaking to please others or win their favour.
What Cassin ultimately wants to do is to step outside of this opposition and rehabilitate
what she calls “sophistics” [la sophistique], a countermodel to the standard philosophical
narrative about logos. According to Cassin, what is lost in this narrative is an understanding of
logos as being first and foremost performative [logos epideiktikos], rather than assertive [logos
apophantikos] (p. 195). For Cassin, what is important about the notion of performance
(epideixis), is that it confronts philosophy with the “third dimension” of language that has been
hidden by the opposition:
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Counting two is what philosophy has habituated us to. When one speaks, one can
either “speak of” or “speak to”… “To speak of,” to unveil, to describe, to
demonstrate, is of the major register of philosophy… “To speak to,” to persuade, to
have an effect on the other, is of the register of rhetoric. From the point of view of
philosophia perennis, there is no third dimension of language. (p. 194)
According to Cassin, the standard philosophical narrative about rhetoric involves an
understanding of language in terms of two axes. Where the first axis is concerned with the
relation between what a speaker says and the world (philosophy), the second axis is concerned
with the relation between a speaker and his or her audience (rhetoric). The first axis concerns the
“speaking of” relation and the second concerns the “speaking to” relation. Against the perennial
opposition of these two axes, Cassin is trying to develop a notion of epideixis prior to the way
that it has been interpreted philosophically. For Cassin, unlike Aristotle and Perelman,2 epideixis
or performance is
the rhetorical genre par excellence, but in excess of rhetoric philosophically assigned
to its place: epideixis does not describe in terms of truth nor simply produces an
effect of persuasion, but it carries out [effectue] with felicity what I call a world
effect [effet-monde]. (Cassin, 2018, p. 96, Trans. mine)
This “world effect”, for Cassin, neither purports to propositionally describe the world as it
“really is,” nor effect any kind of persuasion in an audience. Instead, what Cassin means by
epideixis is rather something like a showing of something, a showing of oneself before others, in
public. What is important about this performative level of speech is that it is prior to the
analytical seperation of assertions from their speakers, their audiences, and the exigencies of the
situations from which they emerge.
Above all, what Cassin shows is why the predominant philosophical orientation toward
language in argumentation theory is so hostile to rhetoric. What I want to show here is that this
does not have to be the case if we look at the problem from a different angle. By taking this into
account, we can avoid conflating two senses of the term “effective.” In the first sense, at the level
of what Cassin calls “speaking to,” “effective” refers to the persuasive outcome of speech on a
living, empirical audience. This is the sense of the term used by Wenzel and others to
characterize rhetorical approaches to argument. In the second sense of what Cassin calls a “world
effect”, the performance of speech is effective to the extent that it is a form of social action that
modifies, to some degree, the situation from which it emerges. We can thus imagine a weak
argument being ineffective in the first sense while at the same time being effective in the second,
such as when, for example, an arguer suffers a loss of credibility through the use of inappropriate
language. Although the argument did not work, so to speak, it nonetheless produced real effects.

4. Assertion, persuasion, performance
I now want to explore some of the consequences of Cassin’s account in light of Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s rhetorical approach to argumentation. As we have seen, Cassin argues that
philosophers typically understand the incompatibility of the philosophical and the rhetorical in
2
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terms of two axes of language, what she called the axes of “speaking of” and “speaking to.”
Since it is typically only the first axis—the traditional axis of philosophy—that admits of being
true or false, rhetoric is relegated to a place detached from the world and from truth. By stepping
outside of this opposition, however, Cassin draws our attention to a “third dimension” of logos
beneath the two axes. As we saw, this epideictic dimension of language was neither that of
assertion nor of persuasion but of performance, a performance that realizes what she called a
“world effect.”3 How are we to understand this in light of the particular concerns of
argumentation theory?
Although Cassin identifies Perelman as one of the “contemporary theoreticians of rhetoric”
who remain implicated in the “philosophical” way of thinking about rhetoric, to a certain extent I
think that both Cassin and Perelman are pushing in the same direction. As I have argued
elsewhere, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s project involves a radical rethinking of the
epideictic genre of rhetoric as it is found in Aristotle (Scott, 2020, p. 30-31). In The Realm of
Rhetoric, Perelman explains that instead of thinking about epideixis as but one of three rhetorical
genres it should be understood as part and parcel of the act of arguing itself (Perelman, 1982, p.
20). Recalling that the epideictic genre was traditionally understood to be concerned with praise
or blame, Perelman sees that at a certain level all arguments function in this way below the
surface. Beneath the content of a particular argument, all argumentation aims to “praise or
blame” at the level of form, i.e., as a form of social action: through the act of arguing particular
values are either selected and emphasized, or ignored and downplayed, within the broader
horizon of values. By shifting attention toward this essential feature Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca invite us to think about argumentation as a form of social action, rather than solely as a
vehicle for communicating that which can be true or false.
Although not always consistent in doing so, it seems to me that this perspectival shift is
why Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are compelled to introduce new concepts and categories
when it might not otherwise be clear why they are needed. As they explain in the introduction to
The New Rhetoric, what they claim to be interested in are “argumentative structures, the analysis
of which must precede all experimental tests of…effectiveness” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca,
1969, p. 9, emphasis mine). Here we can see that what interests Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
is not simply a set of techniques that enable effective persuasion, but rather the basic structures
of argumentation itself.
To take one example let us consider the difference between the concepts of “persuasion”
and “adherence” in their work. In doing so, let us keep in mind the above distinction between the
two different senses of the term “effective” brought out by Cassin’s analysis. Where
“persuasion” refers to the way in which an argument does or does not achieve “validity for a
particular audience,” Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce the term “adherence” to describe
an essential structure of argumentation.4 While adherence may appear at first glance to be a
synonym for persuasion, adherence is in fact something constitutive of argumentation. Unlike
persuasion, adherence does not refer to that which is won or secured by arguing effectively;
rather, adherence is something always already present in an argumentative situation. To put this
Cassin develops this point through a reading of J.L. Austin’s How to Do Things with Words (Austin, 1975). While
I have not explained her departure from Austin here, it may be helpful to note that Cassin’s understanding of
epideixis is closest to what Austin calls “illocution.” The major difference is that Cassin’s broader project is to think
linguistic performance (illocutionary) outside the “regime” of apophansis (locutionary).
4
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another way: if argumentation is fundamentally a kind of social action, the goal or aim of that
action, irrespective of any arguer’s particular motives, is to intensify, diminish, or modify
adherence. Notice the difference here: while persuasion is but one possible goal of
argumentation, acting upon adherence is its telos. Sometimes we argue to persuade our
interlocutor, sometimes we argue to develop our own position further, and so on. Irrespective of
any of these particular goals, all arguers and audiences adhere to a particular set values,
intellectual beliefs, and affective attachments to some degree of intensity at any given time; and
it is this set of variables that Perelman calls “adherence”. Furthermore, this is why argumentation
for Perelman is not so much about installing our own beliefs into the audience as it is about a
“transfer of adherence” within the audience that pre-exists the argumentative situation entirely
(Perelman, 1982, p. 21).
What Wenzel’s characterization of rhetorical approaches leaves out is rhetoric’s concern
with the effectiveness of argumentation at the epideictic level, i.e., at the level of an argument
understood as a practice or as a form of social action. And it is in this sense and to this extent, I
would argue, that rhetorical approaches are primarily concerned with audiences.

5. Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to show that a common philosophical assumption about the meaning of
rhetoric in argumentation theory leads to an unsurpassable divide between epistemic- and
audience-based concerns. By shifting the terms of this conflict from apodeixis to epideixis
through my reading of Cassin, I argued that rhetoric can and should be understood beyond the
opposition of “speaking of” and “speaking to.” When it is conceived only in terms of the latter,
rhetoric cannot but appear as suspicious to philosophy for neglecting the assertive axis of
language, the traditional locus of truth. Although rhetoric may also have something to say about
arguing effectively in one sense of the term, I have tried to show that this is not the only sense of
the term “effective” that is of interest to rhetoric. When analyzed as a form of action, or as
performance (epideixis), as is also the case in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work, rhetoric
can investigate the ways that argumentation acts upon the persons, places, objects, and values
that populate any argumentative situation. Unlike persuasive effects, these “world effects”, as
Cassin calls them, cannot simply be contrasted with assertion and therefore be taken to neglect
the world; for in a very real sense it is through the performance of argument that the world we
inhabit is created, sustained, and modified by these very effects. Understood rhetorically,
argument is thus one of the ways in which we do things with words.
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